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ABSTRACT
Many factors contribute to the determination of top executive compensation. This
paper explores and examines the systematic difference of high-tech and low-tech CEO
pays. It examines the relationship between top executive compensation and an
Organizational factor, a Market factor and an Accounting factor. It tests CEO’s salary,
bonus, and long-term compensation with respect to corporate reputation, ROE,
Tobin’s Q, CEO shareholding and firm size.
The results show that CEOs’ Salaries at high-tech firms shows a significantly
positive relationship with ROE, Tobin’s Q, and corporate reputation, while only
corporate reputation shows a significant relationship with CEOs’ salaries at low-tech
firms. In addition, both the high-tech and low-tech firm executives’ total
compensation are significantly and positively related to Tobin’s Q, and corporate
reputation. Similar results are reported with Long-term compensation. In general,
high-tech firms tend to use more sophisticated performance measures for the
determination of CEO compensation, while low-tech firms seem to use a simple
performance measure such as corporate reputation.
Keywords: US CEO Compensation, Corporate Reputation, Accounting Performance,
Market Performance
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INTRODUCTION
Managers in high-tech firms are faced with different sets of performance
expectations such as innovation, new product development, integration of technology
and research and development management. Agency theory in accounting and finance
suggests that firms should design incentive compensation system such that agent’s
(manager) interest is in line with principal’s (shareholder) interest. Shareholders
design the CEO compensation package in order to motivate and monitor managers and
align managers’ objectives with shareholders’ objectives. Shareholders attempt to
insure that CEOs act in a manner that maximizes the value of organization, its owners
and other stakeholders.
As compared to low-tech firms, the success of high-tech firms depends more
upon managing intangible assets such as technology innovation, continuous
improvement, software development and knowledge-based management. High tech
firms must continuously innovate to survive and to sustain growth in increasingly
competitive and global markets. Balkin et al. (2000) have shown that “CEO
compensation was related to innovation as measured by number of patents and R&D
spending.” Their findings are very interesting and show an important change in CEO
compensation which in the past has been heavily tied to accounting and stock
performance measures. Balkin et al. (2000) study reports an important change and a
new trend in managerial compensation, relies more on process (innovation) rather than
financial results such as accounting and market performance measures.
In today’s competitive market, managers should focus more on managing
processes which will yield financial results such as accounting and stock performance.
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996, 1997) have long been argued in favor of a balance of
various performance measures not a single performance induce goal-congruent
behavior. They have argued that, to align performance with company’s mission and
strategies, performance should be measured with a combination of four different
perspectives; Financial perspective, Customer perspective, Learning and Growth
perspective and Business and Production Process perspective. Kaplan and Norton
proposed to use a Balanced Scorecard in evaluating corporate performance. They
argue that employees’ learning and growth improve organization’s production and
quality of services. Organizational and production efficiency increase customer
satisfaction and therefore financial results. Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) have
shown that CEOs are “paid for the level of information processing that their jobs
requires.” Their findings showed that “CEO compensation was higher in firms whose
diversification strategy, approaches to technology, and top management team structure
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placed particularly high information-processing demands on their CEOs.”
This study explores the determinants of the high-tech and low-tech CEO pays.
This paper attempts to examine how high-tech and low-tech CEO pays are related to
various performance measures such as corporate reputation, firm size, CEO’s stock
ownership, ROE and Tobin’s Q. It also attempts to examine the systematic difference
in CEO pays and the performance expectations of high-tech firms and low-tech firms.
The results in general exhibit that high-tech firms tend to use a comprehensive
and a more sophisticated performance measures than those of low-tech firms. The
salaries of high-tech firm executives show a significantly positive relationship with
ROE, Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation, while corporate reputation shows a
significantly positive relationship with that of low-tech firms. For the CEOs’ total
compensation, Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation show a significantly positive
relationship with both high-tech and low-tech firms. Similar results are exhibited for
the long-term compensation.
This paper makes two important contributions. First, it provides a better
classification of high-technology firms. Most previous studies (Balkin et al., 2000;
Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Shim and Lee, 1995) classify high-technology
industry as an industry with Research and Development expenditure greater than 5%
of total sales. This classification is based on the industry R&D expenditure rather than
a firm’s proportional R&D expenditure and can be misleading. Because, with this
classification, a firm would be classified as a high-tech firm as long as it belongs to an
industry with average R&D expenditure greater than 5% of sales, even though this
firm’s R&D expenditure may be less than 5% of total sales. This paper refines the
high-tech classification. It is not only based on industry-average R&D expenditures
but based on a firm’s proportional R&D expenditures. That is, in order to be classified
as a high-tech firm, a firm’s R&D expenditure should be more than 5% of total sales.
The results of this study would be robust with the refined high-tech classification.
Baruch survey (1997) showed that a set of 3 criteria were used most often for hightechnology company: (1) percentage of employees with a university degree (more
than 10%), (2) Percentage of investment in research and development (more than 5%)
and (3) the area of activity of the organization (industry sector). Second, this paper
examines a more comprehensive relationship between top executive compensation
and corporate performance. It specifically incorporates corporate reputation as a
possible explanatory variable to the executive compensation in addition to accounting
and market-based performance. Previous studies overlooked this important variable.
This paper will help in filling gap and provide better understanding on compensation
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and performance relationship.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a literature review
and the testable hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology: sample, data
collection and research methods. The fourth section provides results and analyses. The
final section presents summary, conclusions and further research issues.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Balkin, Markman and Gomez-Mejia (2000) investigated CEO pay in hightechnology firms. They compared the CEO pays of 90 high-technology firms with 74
low-technology firms (control sample). By using the number of patents and R&D
spending as surrogates for innovation, they found that CEO short-term compensation
was related to innovation and the relationship was ‘less consistent temporal’ for the
long-term compensation in high-technology firms. For the low-tech firms, no
relationship was found between innovation and either short- or long-term
compensation. Their study provides important evidence that ties CEO compensation
with process and innovation rather than accounting and stock performance.
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) have examined a very comprehensive relationship
between CEO compensation and managerial discretion for the Fortune 1,000 firms.
Their study showed that “CEO compensation was positively related to managerial
discretion such as market growth, R&D intensity, Advertising intensity and
Concentration. They also showed that ROE, firm size and CEO tenure are
significantly related to CEO compensation. Other studies have shown that other
factors contribute to the determination of the CEO pays such as internationalization
(Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), governance structure, ownership structure (David et.
al., 1998), CEO power and managerial discretion (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argues that the relationship between CEO
pays and firm performance is limited because many other variables influence the CEO
pays. Many previous studies suggest that the explanatory power of the pay-forperformance sensitivity is relatively low (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This paper
attempts to enhance understanding of the determinants of CEO pays in high-tech and
low-tech industry. This paper fills the gap and extends the Balkin et al. (2000) and
previous studies by empirically investigating a more comprehensive relationship. It
specifically examines the relationship between a set of CEO compensation variables
and a set of performance variables. Most previous studies are missing an important
determinant of the CEO compensation, corporate reputation. The Balkin et al. (2000)
study is missing a number of important determinant variables of CEO compensation
such as stock performance and corporate reputation. This paper is an attempt to
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provide additional evidence and to examine a comprehensive relationship for hightech and low-tech firms using relatively recent data, 1999-2001. Since high-tech firms
seem to rely more on stock-based performance measures for the determination of CEO
compensation, the followings are the proposed hypotheses:
H1: High-tech CEO’s compensation is positively related to the market
performance.
H2: High-tech CEO’s compensation is positively related to corporate reputation.
H3: High-tech CEO’s compensation is positively related to accounting
performance.
METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection
Sample firms were initially selected from the “Fortune’s 500 America’s Most
Admired Companies.” The Fortune provides rankings of the corporate reputation
according to 6 attributes: (1) Ability to Attract, (2) Quality of product or services, (3)
Increase in market share (4) Quality of Management, (5) Innovativeness, and (6)
Develop and keep talented people. The sample, “Fortune’s 500 America Most
Admired Companies,” is matched with the Forbes “1999-2001 Top 800 CEO
Paychecks.” This matching resulted in 313 firms that both corporate reputation and
compensation data are available. The corresponding financial data were gathered from
Compustat. The 37 firms were excluded form the sample due to lack of data on
financial performance variables and other variables. Finally 276 firms were chosen
and utilized for this study, divided into 111 high-tech firms and 165 low-tech firms.
The majority of total sample firms are in the Financial Services (SIC, 6000-6999)
industry, 38 firms or 14%, in the Wholesale, Retailers & Food services industry, 24
firms or 9%. The majority of the sample, 88% of the total sample, 244 firms, comes
from large corporations with over $2 billion of assets.
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Table 1-A Number of Firms in Samples by Type of Industry:
High-techa vs. Low-tech
Industry
High-tech Low-tech Total SIC
Mining & Drilling
3
15
18 1000-1499, 2900-2999
Construction
0
4
4
1500-1799
Food, Drink, & Tobacco
0
12
12 0-999, 2000-2199
Textile & Apparel
0
3
3
2200-2399
Lumber & Wood Products
1
11
12 2400-2699
Drugs & Chemicals
20
0
20 2800-2899
Rubber, Plastic, & Leather
1
3
4
3000-3199
Prime & Fabric Metals
13
3
16 3300-3499
Machinery & Computer
17
0
17 3500-3599
Electric & Electronic Equip.
14
0
14 3600-3699
Transportation Equipments
15
0
15 3700-3799
Measurement Instruments
12
0
12 3800-3899
Computer Related Sevices
15
2
17 7370-7399
Transportation & Leisure Serv.
0
15
15 4000-4700, 7000-7099
Publishing & Communication
0
18
18 2700-2799, 4800-4899
Wholesale, Retailer, & Food Serv.
0
24
24 5000-5999
Financial Services
0
38
38 6000-6999
Other Business Services
0
17
17 4900-4999, 7500-8999
Total
111
165
276

a. High-tech counts are firms with more than 5% in R&D intensity

Variable Definition
Executive compensation is normally separated into salary (SALA), bonus
(BONU) and long-term (LCOM) compensations. Total compensation (TCOM) is
measured by the sum of salary, bonus and long-term compensation.
For the independent variables, a set of proxies for Accounting Factor, Market
(Stock-based) factor, and Organizational factor has been selected. For the accounting
factor, Return On Equity (ROE) was utilized for the proxy for an accounting
performance measure, while Tobin’s Q (TBQ) were used as a surrogate for market
factor. The ROE is calculated by dividing net income by average balance of common
stockholder's equity. Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for the book-to-market value.
Tobin’s Q3 = [MVE + PS + DEBT] / [TA]. Where MVE is the market value of
shareholder equity (product of a firm’s closing stock price and the number of common
stock shares outstanding), PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding
preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its shortterm assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long term debt, and TA is the book value
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of the total assets of the firm. We employed the approximation of Tobin’s Q as in
Chung and Pruitt (1994), because it only requires data from COMPUSTAT. The
Chung and Pruitt (1994) study revealed that this approximation of Tobin’s Q has an
extremely high predictive accuracy when compared to the original formulation
(Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).
Table 1-B Number of Firms in Total Sample by Asset Size
Asset Size
Less than
$ 2,000 mil.
$ 2,001 3,000
3,001 5,000
5,001 7,000
7,001 - 10,000
10,001 15,000
15,001 25,000
25,001 40,000
40,001 - 100,000
Larger than $100,000 mil.
Total

Count
32
30
42
32
17
35
28
21
24
15
111

For the organizational factor, Company reputation (CORU) was utilized.
Company Reputation is the average score of company reputation composed by eight
attributes: quality of management; quality of products or services; innovativeness;
long-term investment value; financial soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep
talented people; responsibility to the community and the environment; and wise use of
corporate assets. In addition, two control variables were used for the analysis. Firm
size is well documented and researched to have a significant positive relationship with
CEO compensation in many studies. In addition, the CEO stock ownership is also
included as a control variable. The CEO Stock Ownership (OCEO) was measured by
the percentage of outstanding stockholdings by the CEO.
For the data analysis, descriptive statistics for each variable were computed first.
Then, Pearson's Product Moment Coefficient of Correlation was utilized to identify
the intercorrelation among the various measures. Finally, lagged regression analysis
was employed to determine the significance and magnitude of the relationships
between CEO compensation and various organizational and financial performance
measures. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method was used to estimate the
regression parameters.
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The lagged regression models are as follows;
Ln (SALt) = a + b1 TBQt-1 + b2 ROEt-1 + b3 CORUt-1 + b4 FSIZt-1 + b5 OCEOt-1
+e
Ln (LCOMt) = a + b1 TBQt-1 + b2 ROEt-1 + b3 CORUt-1 + b4 FSIZt-1 + b5
OCEOt-1 + e
Ln (TCOMt) = a + b1 TBQt-1 + b2 ROEt-1 + b3 CORUt-1 + b4 FSIZt-1 + b5
OCEOt-1 + e
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The descriptive statistics of the variables for high-tech firms are presented in the
Table 2-A and Low-tech firms are in the Table 2-B. Mean total compensation for the
high-tech CEO in 2000 and in 2001 was about $16.4 million and $13.3 million, while
the low-tech firms’ mean total compensation is $7.5 million and $8.4 million
respectively. This indicates that high-tech firms’ executives are receiving substantially
higher total compensation than that of the low-tech counterparts. In addition, hightech firms’ CEO pays rely heavily on long-term compensation, represented 86% of its
total compensation in 2000 and 83% of its total compensation in 2001. On the
contrary, only 70% of low-tech executives’ total compensation was in the form of
long-term compensation in 2000 and 68% in 2001. High-tech executives’ cash
compensation, Salary and Bonus, accounts for only about 14% of total compensation
in 2000 and about 17% of total compensation in 2001. This means that almost all of
the CEOs’ compensation is in the form of stock.
As Table 3-A, 3-B, 4-A and 4-B Indicate, CEO Compensation is highly
correlated with Firm size in both high-tech and low-tech companies. On the contrary
high-tech companies’ CEO compensation exhibits a high correlation with CEO share
ownership, while low-tech companies’ CEO compensation is highly correlated with
Company reputation. This difference is would be investigated further.
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Table 2-A Descriptive Statistics: High-tech vs. Low-techa (Year 1999-2000)
High-tech
Mean Std. Dev.
878.13 345.82
2,132.31 1,411.09
14,278.33 63,245.05
16,410.64 63,633.00
19.62
31.79
3.13
3.46
6.41
0.99
1.03
3.27
8.89
1.00

Variables
Salaryb
Salary & Bonusb
Long-term Comp. b
Total Compensationb
ROE
Tobin's Q
Company Reputation
Ownership (%)
Firm Size: Ln (Sales)

Low-tech
Mean
Std. Dev.
860.58
305.27
2,280.14
2,029.87
5,206.31
15,989.93
7,486.45
17,026.40
9.59
74.44
1.55
1.81
6.32
0.94
1.88
5.37
9.04
1.04

Table 2-B Descriptive Statistics: High-tech vs. Low-techa (Year 2000-2001)
High-tech
Mean Std. Dev.
884.64 326.16
2,165.23 1,501.14
11,125.90 30,488.45
13,291.13 30,870.35
12.35
37.34
2.54
2.44
6.20
0.96
0.86
3.08
8.98
1.01

Variables
Salaryb
Salary & Bonusb
Long-term Comp. b
Total Compensationb
ROE
Tobin's Q
Company Reputation
Ownership (%)
Firm Size: Ln (Sales)
a.
b

Low-tech
Mean
Std. Dev.
900.92
338.10
2,750.05
2,803.71
5,694.23
18,277.29
8,444.28
20,306.54
15.15
25.33
1.40
1.73
6.12
1.03
1.74
5.27
9.18
1.08

High-tech (n = 111) vs. Low-tech (n = 165)
In thousands of dollars
Table 3-A Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: High-techa
(Samples for 1999 and 2000 Analysis)
Variable

Mean

b

1. Salary , 2000

878.13
b

2. Salary & Bonus , 2000

Std. Dev

3. Long-term Compensation , 2000 14,278.33 63,245.05
4. Total Compensationb, 2000
5. ROE, 1999
6. Tobin's Q, 1999
7. Company Reputation, 1999
8. Ownership, 1999
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 1999

3

4

5

6

7

8

0.639***
0.087

16,410.64 63,633.00 0.185*
19.62
31.79 -0.030
3.13
3.46 0.169*
6.41
0.99 0.163
1.03
8.89

2

345.82

2,132.31 1,411.09
b

1

0.264**
0.285**
0.182*
0.187*
0.250**

3.27 -0.115
0.021
1.00 0.572*** 0.565***

0.734***
0.023
0.027
*
0.179
0.029
0.226* 0.230*
0.090
0.032

0.090
0.044

0.092
0.140

0.523***
*

0.187
0.069

0.191* 0.186*
-0.042 0.407*** -0.053
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Table 3-B Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: Low-techa
(Samples for 1999 and 2000 Analysis)
Variable

Mean

1. Salaryb, 2001

860.58

2. Salary & Bonusb, 2001

Std. Dev

1

3

4

0.897***
0.245**
0.179*
0.168*
0.229**
0.206**

0.176*
0.182*
0.257**
0.216**
0.226**

5

6

7

8

2,280.14 2,029.87 0.587***

3. Long-term Compensationb, 2001 5,206.31 15,989.93 -0.058
b

2

305.27

7,486.45 17,026.40
4. Total Compensation , 2001
5. ROE, 2000
9.59
74.44
6. Tobin's Q, 2000
1.55
1.81
7. Company Reputation, 2000
6.32
0.94
8. Ownership, 2000
1.88
5.37
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 2000
9.04
1.04
a. n = 111
b. In thousand of dollars
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

-0.028
0.147
0.199*
0.063
0.174*
0.419***

0.231**
0.277**
0.184*
0.176*
0.183*
-0.168
0.452***

0.194*
0.321*** 0.541***
0.098
0.238* 0.002
**
0.209
0.065
0.416*** -0.010

The results of OLS lagged regression analysis are presented in the Table 5-A, 5B and 5-C. In high-technology firms, salary shows a significantly positive relationship
with all of the tested variables; ROE, Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation. On the other
hand, only corporate reputation shows a significantly positive relationship in lowtechnology firms in 2000-2001. Long-term compensation shows somewhat different
results as compared to that of salary. Both high-tech and low-tech CEO pays show a
significantly positive relationship with Tobin’s Q and corporate reputation. The results
of total compensation are almost identical to that of the long-term compensation.
Given that salary accounts for less than 20% of total compensation, it is not surprising
that the results of long-term compensation and the results of total compensation are
identical. The results are consistent with and confirm Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
The results indicate that high-tech firms tend to use a more sophisticated
compensation package and rely more on stock based compensation, while low-tech
firms adopt a compensation package that relies more on a single variable, reputation.
For the high tech firms, ROE, Tobin’s Q, and reputation show a significant
relationship with CEO salary, while only reputation shows a significant positive
relationship in low-tech firms.
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Table 4-A Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: High-techa
(Samples for 2000 and 2001 Analysis)
Variable
Mean Std. Dev
1. Salaryb, 2000
884.64 326.16
b
2. Salary & Bonus , 2000
2,165.23 1,501.14
b
3. Long-term Compensation , 2000 11,125.90 30,488.45
4. Total Compensationb, 2000
13,291.13 30,870.35
5. ROE, 1999
12.35
37.34
6. Tobin's Q, 1999
2.54
2.44
7. Company Reputation, 1999
6.20
0.96
8. Ownership, 1999
0.86
3.08
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 1999
8.98
1.01

1

2

0.328***
0.306*** 0.463***
0.327*** 0.554***
-0.069 0.065
0.036 -0.017
0.068 0.261***
-0.105 0.012
0.394*** 0.342***

3

4

0.994***
0.073
0.175*
0.297***
0.042
0.164*

0.077
0.173*
0.312***
0.167*
0.195*

5

6

7

8

0.097
0.345*** 0.171*
0.027 0.093 0.199*
-0.036 -0.043 0.169* -0.050

Table 4-B Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: Low-techa
(Samples for 2000 and 2001 Analysis)
Variable
Mean Std. Dev
1
2
3
b
1. Salary , 2001
900.92 338.10
2. Salary & Bonusb, 2001
2,750.05 2,803.71 0.271***
3. Long-term Compensationb, 2001 5,694.23 18,277.29 0.093 0.687***
4. Total Compensationb, 2001
8,444.28 20,306.54 0.122 0.756*** 0.994***
5. ROE, 2000
15.15
25.33 0.076 0.073 0.061
6. Tobin's Q, 2000
1.40
1.73 0.080 0.001 0.168*
7. Company Reputation, 2000
6.12
1.03 0.139 0.284*** 0.256***
8. Ownership, 2000
1.74
5.27 -0.059 -0.007 -0.015
9. Firm Size: Ln(Sales), 2000
9.18
1.08 0.331*** 0.404*** 0.264***
a. n = 165
b. In thousand of dollars
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

4

0.165*
0.243**
0.269***
-0.014
0.293***

5

6

7

0.141
-0.011 0.128
-0.018 0.031 0.207**
-0.046 -0.083 0.238** -0.038

Table 5-A Results of OLS Lagged Regression Analysis for Salarya
Variables
ROE
Tobin’s Q
Reputation
CEO Ownership
Firm Size
Adjusted R2
F-Ratio

Year (1999-2000)
High-techb
Low-techc
-0.012(.003)
-0.092(.132)
0.020(.015)
0.013(.035)
**
0.212(.042)**
0.214(.009)
*
-0.175(.063)*
-0.137(.045)
***
0.452(.120)
0.303(.102)***
0.242
0.219
4.210***
3.569**

8

Year (2000-2001)
High-techb
Low-techc
0.068(.048)
0.208(.087)*
*
0.158(.042)
0.018(.012)*
0.147(.038)*
0.159(.042)**
*
-0.234(.101)
-0.153(.013)*
***
0.441(.102)
0.280(.027)**
0.327
0.264
6.682***
4.258***
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Table 5-B Results of OLS Lagged Regression Analysis for Long-term Compensationa
Variables
ROE
Tobin’s Q
Reputation
CEO Ownership
Firm Size
Adjusted R2
F-Ratio

Year (1999-2000)
High-techb
Low-techc
-0.014(.012)
-0.041(.010)
*
0.198(.082)
0.198(.082)*
0.212(.042)**
0.270(.052)**
*
0.021(.013)
-0.154(.071)
0.228(.178)**
0.187(.079)*
0.319
0.220
5.025***
4.433***

Year (2000-2001)
High-techb
Low-techc
0.091(.048)
0.083(.051)
*
0.188(.043)
0.148(.052)*
0.125(.033)*
0.244(.073)**
*
-0.238(.058)
-0.102(.086)
0.186(.078)*
0.264(.102)**
0.304
0.235
6.114***
5.612***

Table 5-C Results of OLS Lagged Regression Analysis for Total Compensationa
Year (1999-2000)
Year (2000-2001)
Variables
High-techb
Low-techc
High-techb
Low-techc
ROE
0.081(.037)
0.039(.010)
0.102(.081)
0.070(.043)
**
*
**
Tobin’s Q
0.182(.074)
0.176(.073)
0.271(.058)
0.185(.087)*
***
**
**
0.212(.042)
0.246(.065)
0.249(.102)**
Reputation
0.329(.112)
CEO Ownership
-0.104(.075)
-0.022(.018)
0.198(.051)
0.069(.038)
**
*
**
0.143(.052)
0.298(.101)
0.286(.021)**
Firm Size
0.301(.151)
Adjusted R2
0.287
0.225
0.328
0.219
F-Ratio
4.819***
4.012**
6.856***
5.120**
a. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients; Standard error s are in parentheses.
*
P < 0.05 ** P < 0.01 *** P <0.001
b. High-tech industry (n=111)
c. Low-tech industry (n=165)
d. Total sample including High-tech and Low-tech industry (n=276)

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH ISSUES
This paper reports the results of a recent empirical study of the determinants of
CEO compensation in high-tech and low-tech firms. This paper finds that CEO
compensation at high-tech firms relies more on corporate reputation and use a more
sophisticated performance measures for the determination of the CEO compensation.
This line of research can be extended to include other countries’ sample and can also
be conducted with an industry-specific sample. The examination of the performance
and compensation relationship with a specific industry would add to the understanding
of the relationship. Comparative studies with other countries, such as Germany and
Japan, would enlighten the linkage of compensation and a set of performance
variables in different economic environments, since companies compete globally. It
would be a new and important line of research, if we examine the relationship for
other countries such as Japan and Germany (Barkema and Gomex-Mejia, 1998). In
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addition, other performance indicators should be examined in order to better
understand the determinants of CEO compensation. For example, is CEO
compensation tied to Customer satisfaction measures or Employee productivity and
efficiency? Are Production and organization effectiveness and efficiency matter for
CEO compensation?
A more comprehensive examination will increase the
understanding of the performance and compensation relationship.
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